Securely outsourcing computation to untrusted cloud servers has attracted a lot of attention in recent years. In this paper we consider datasets where every item is labeled by a number of attributes and study the problem of securely outsourcing the summation of a subset of the data items. We propose a verifiable summation on outsourced data (VSOD) model and construct two schemes in this model. Our VSOD schemes allow an input client to store a dataset on a cloud server and allow an output client to offload the summation of a subset of the data items to the cloud server, where the subset can be defined by a read-once formula and a number of indicator functions. This kind of computations can capture many real-world queries to datasets. Our schemes are secure such that no malicious server is able to persuade the output client to accept a wrong result. Our schemes are outsourceable such that the client's computation is substantially faster than the native computation of the summation. Compared with the existing solutions, the outsourceability of our schemes is not based on multiple datasets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing allows resource-restricted clients to outsource both large-scale data and computations on the data to powerful cloud servers in a pay-per-use manner, which is scalable and economical. However, outsourcing computation has also posed many security concerns [15] as the cloud servers are not always trusted. In particular, the cloud servers may have strong financial incentives [22] to run an extremely fast but incorrect computation in order to free up valuable computing time for other transactions. How to discourage the cloud servers from cheating has been one of the main security concerns in the field of outsourcing computation.
There are many emerging solutions [4] , [15] - [18] for securely outsourcing computations. In particular, in the homomorphic authenticators (HAs) of [2] , [6] , [8] , [17] , [18] , the client stores both a set m = {m i } N i=1 of data items and their authenticators t = {t i } N i=1 on a cloud server; given a function f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and an index set S = {i 1 , . . . , i n } ⊆ [N ], the cloud server can perform a computation of the function f
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jiafeng Xie. both on the subset {m i 1 , . . . , m i n } of data items and on the subset {t i 1 , . . . , t i n } of authenticators, in order to obtain the result ρ = f (m i 1 , . . . , m i n ) and its authenticator π; finally, the client can verify if the server has done the expected computation of ρ correctly. The authenticator π is constructed such that no malicious server is able to persuade the client to accept a wrong result. Ideally, the client's verification should be substantially faster than the native computation of ρ, which refers to the computation of ρ on the client's local device and without the help of a cloud server. HA schemes with this efficiency property is said to be outsourceable.
While the HA schemes of [2] , [6] , [8] , [17] , [18] were constructed for datasets of the form m = {m i } N i=1 , in this paper, we consider datasets where all data items may be labeled by a set of attributes. For example, the dataset of interest may be a list (5000, 8500, 9000, 20000, 15000) of people's salaries with each element being labeled by the respective person's age and working age (see TABLE 1) . For this kind of datasets, interesting computations such as computing the average salary of the people of age ≤ 50 and working age ≥ 10 can be reduced to computing the summation of the salaries of the people of age ≤ 50 and working age ≥ 10. Therefore, for this kind of datasets we will be particularly interested in the summations of the data items whose attributes satisfy meaningful conditions.
The existing HA techniques [2] , [6] , [8] , [17] , [18] may provide solutions for such computations. However, they usually suffer from various drawbacks in efficiency. Some of the existing HA schemes [8] , [17] , [18] are based on very expensive cryptographic primitives that can result in fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and garbled circuits (GCs); some of the existing HA schemes [6] require the client to perform a computation as heavy as the outsourced computation, i.e., they are not outsourceable; the others [2] are not outsourceable unless there are multiple datasets and the summation of data items at exactly the same locations of all these datasets are considered.
A. PROBLEM FORMALIZATION
The problem we shall study in this paper involves three kinds of parties: an input client, a cloud server and an output client. The input client has a dataset m = {m i } N i=1 whose N elements are indexed by r attributes A 1 , . . . , A r ; each attribute A i may take d i possible values and N = r i=1 d i . By setting up a bijection between the index set [N ] = {1, . . . , N } and the index set I = [d 1 ] × · · · × [d r ], we can equivalently denote the dataset m as m = {m i } i∈I . The output client has a subset S ⊆ I and wants to learn the sum ρ = i∈S m i . The problem is how to store the dataset of the input client on a cloud server and offload the computation of ρ to the server such that the output client is able to efficiently verify the correctness of the server's computation result, neither using the expensive cryptographic primitives nor using multiple datasets.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we propose a verifiable summation on outsourced data (VSOD) model in order to solve the above problem. In our model, the input client generates both an authenticator t for the dataset m and a private key sk for preparing the index set S; it stores (m, t) on a cloud server and keeps sk private. The index set S will be defined by a read-once formula C(x 1 , . . . , x r ) and r indicator functions X 1 : [d 1 ] → {0, 1}, . . . , X r : [d r ] → {0, 1} as (see Section II-B for the details) S = (i 1 , . . . , i r ) ∈ I : C(X 1 (i 1 ), . . . , X r (i r )) = 1
Given S, the input client will use sk to produce a verification key vk for the output client. Given S, the cloud server will produce both the result ρ = i∈S m i and a proof π for this result. Finally, the output client will use vk and π to verify if the server's result ρ has been correctly computed. A VSOD scheme is said to be publicly verifiable if vk can be made public such that both the input client and the output client are able to perform the verification; otherwise, the scheme is said to be privately verifiable. A VSOD scheme is said to be outsourceable if the input client's computation of vk and the output client's verification of ρ are substantially faster than the native computation of ρ.
In this paper we construct both a private VSOD scheme and a public VSOD scheme. The proposed schemes support any summations over an index set S of the form (1) . Compared with the existing solutions, our VSOD schemes are not based on the expensive cryptographic primitives; the outsourceability of our VSOD schemes does not require multiple datasets. We also implement the proposed schemes. Our experiments show that the outsourceability of our schemes will be visible for |S| ≥ 1.8 × 10 5 .
C. OUR TECHNIQUES
In our VSOD schemes an authenticator t i will be computed for every data item m i . These authenticators together allow the cloud server to generate a proof for every outsourced computation. In our private VSOD scheme, the authenticator for every data item m i will be computed with a PRF F k : I → G as
where g is the generator of a cyclic group G. Given S ⊆ I , the cloud server will return
The verification will be done with checking the equality π = g aρ i∈S F k (i).
In our construction, the F k will be chosen as an algebraic PRF with closed-form efficiency such that the computation of i∈S F k (i) is substantially faster than the native computation of ρ and thus the outsourceability is enabled. PRFs with closed-form efficiency [3] are PRFs that can use the secret key k to significantly speed-up specific computations on a set of PRF generated values. In this paper we show that an instantiation of the Naor-Reingold PRFs [20] would allow this kind of efficiency for the computation of i∈S F k (i), as long as S has the form (1). More precisely, we show a recursive algorithm CFEval(k, S) that can trade space for time and actually conduct the computation of i∈S F k (i) in parallel. Our public VSOD scheme will be based on a similar idea but use an instantiation of the Lewko-Waters PRFs [19] .
D. RELATED WORK
The systematic study on the securely outsourcing computation problem was initiated by the verifiable computation (VC) model of [15] , which allows a client to offload the heavy computation of a function f at any input x to a cloud server and then efficiently verify the server's result. VC schemes for outsourcing functions as generic as any boolean circuits [1] , [9] , [10] , [15] and as specific as polynomials [3] , [7] , [12] , [13] , [21] have been both proposed during the past decade. In particular, the notion of algebraic PRFs with closed-form efficiency was introduced in [3] . These schemes considered a different scenario where the function f (instead of the data x) is stored on the server.
Our model and schemes are closely related to the homomorphic message authenticators of [2] , [6] , [8] , [17] , [18] , which allow one to outsource single or multiple datasets together with their authenticators to a cloud server such that any admissible computations of the datasets can be verified with a related computation on the authenticators. As stated above, these schemes have limited outsourceability [2] , [6] or require very expensive cryptographic primitives [5] , [8] , [11] , [14] , [18] , which are not likely affordable by the weak clients.
E. ORGANIZATION
In Section II we formally define the VSOD model, and also provide necessary backgrounds on the read-once formulas and the algebraic PRFs with closed-form efficiency; in Section III we present two VSOD schemes; in Section IV, we implement the proposed schemes and show our experimental results; In Section V we conclude the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let λ be a security parameter. We denote with poly(λ) any polynomial function in λ. A function (λ) is said to be negligible in λ and denoted as negl(λ) if (λ) = o(λ −c ) for any c > 0. Let A(·) be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm. We denote with ''y ← A(x)'' the process of running a PPT algorithm A on an input x and assigning its output to y.
A. VERIFIABLE SUMMATION OF OUTSOURCED DATA
Our model for verifiable summation of outsourced data (VSOD) involves three kinds of parties: an input client, a cloud server, and an output client. In our model, the input client may collect a set m = {m i } i∈I of data items and store them on a cloud server, where I = [d 1 ] × · · · × [d r ] and d 1 , . . . , d r > 0 are r integers, and the output client may want to learn the sum ρ = i∈S m i for a specific subset S ⊆ I . A VSOD scheme both allows the cloud server to compute ρ for the output client and allows the output client to efficiently verify if the server has performed the computation correctly. 
vk ← Vgen(sk, S) takes the private key sk and a subset S ⊆ I as input and generates a (private or public) verification key vk. -(ρ, π) ← Sum(m, t, S) takes the dataset m, the tag t and the subset S as input, and outputs both the sum ρ = i∈S m i and a proof π . -{0, 1} ← Vrfy(vk, ρ, π ) takes the verification key vk, the result ρ and the proof π as input, and outputs either 1 (accept ρ) or 0 (reject ρ). In our model, the input client will run Stor(1 λ , m) to produce (sk, t) and store (m, t) on the cloud server; in order to learn the value of ρ = i∈S m i , the output client needs to send S ⊆ I to the input client, who generates vk ← Vgen(sk, S) for the output client; given S ⊆ I , the cloud server will compute (ρ, π) ← Sum(m, t, S) for the output client; finally, the output client will run Vrfy(vk, ρ, π ) to verify if ρ has been correctly computed. The key vk can be public or private. If vk is public, then we say that is publicly verifiable. Otherwise, we say that is privately verifiable.
A VSOD scheme should satisfy certain properties on correctness, verifiability, and efficiency. The correctness property requires that if all algorithms of are faithfully executed, then the verification algorithm should always output 1.
Definition 2 (Correctness): The VSOD scheme is said to be correct if, for any λ, any dataset m = {m i } i∈I , any (sk, t) ← Stor(1 λ , m), any S ⊆ I , any vk ← Vgen(sk, S), and any (ρ, π) ← Sum(m, t, S), it holds that Vrfy(vk, ρ, π ) = 1. The verifiability of a VSOD scheme requires that no cloud server should be able to persuade an output client to accept a wrong result.
Definition 3 (Private Verifiability): Let A be any PPT adversary. We define a security experiment EXP PriVer ,A (λ, m) where A and its challenger work as below:
• Given a dataset m = {m i } i∈I , the challenger computes (t, sk) ← Stor(1 λ , m), gives (m, t) to A and keeps sk private;
• For = 1 to q = poly(λ): -A chooses a subset S ⊆ I and a pair (ρ ,π ) to the challenger; the challenger computes vk ← Vgen(sk, S ), and b = Vrfy(vk,ρ ,π ), and gives b to A.
-We say that A wins and define EXP PriVer
,
The VSOD scheme is said to be privately verifiable if for any dataset m, any PPT adversary A, there is a negligible function negl(λ) such that
where the probability is taken over all random coins in the security experiment. Definition 4 (Public Verifiability): Let A be any PPT adversary. We define a security experiment EXP PubVer ,A (λ, m) where A and its challenger work as below:
• For = 1 to q = poly(λ): -A chooses a subset S ⊆ I to the challenger; the challenger computes vk ← Vgen(sk, S ), and gives vk to A.
• A picks S ⊆ I and sends it to the challenger; the challenger gives vk ← Vgen(sk, S) to A; A picks (ρ,π ) and sends it to the challenger;
• We say that A wins and define EXP PubVer
The VSOD scheme is said to be publicly verifiable if for any dataset m, any PPT adversary A, there is a negligible function negl(λ) such that
where the probability is taken over all random coins in the security experiment.
As the main objective of outsourcing computation is to minimize the computational overhead of the clients, a meaningful VSOD scheme should be efficient such that the client's executions of Vgen and Vrfy are substantially faster than the native computation of ρ. In our VSOD model, the execution of Stor can be more expensive than the native computation of i∈S m i for a subset S. However, it will be done only once by the input client to generate a pair (t, m) for the cloud server. After the one-time execution, with the same (t, m) the scheme can be used to compute i∈S m i for many different subsets S. Therefore, the one-time cost of executing Stor can be amortized over these computations. Following [3] , [15] , we do not include the one-time cost of executing Stor in Definition 5. This kind of models for outsourcing computation are called with preprocessing. In particular, the preprocessing in our VSOD model refers to the one-time execution of Stor.
B. READ-ONCE FORMULA (ROF)
In this paper, we shall construct VSOD schemes that allow the computation of ρ = i∈S m i , where the subset S ⊆ I can be defined by a read-once formula.
For any integer r > 0, let B r = {0, 1} r be the set of all r-bit binary vectors. A boolean variable x is a variable over {0, 1}. The negation of x is 1 − x and denoted byx. A literal is a boolean variable x or its negationx. Given two literals x and y, the operation ''∧'' is defined such that x ∧ y = 1 if and only if x = y = 1 and the operation ''∨'' is defined such that x ∨ y = 0 if and only if x = y = 0. A boolean formula in boolean variables x 1 , . . . , x r is a formula recursively defined with the following rules: • If u and v are boolean formulas, then u ∨ v is a boolean formula. A read-once boolean formula in x 1 , . . . , x r is a boolean formula where at most one of the literals {x i ,x i } occurs for every i ∈ [r]. A read-once boolean formula C can be described by a labelled binary tree, where • the ≤ r leaves are labelled by all literals that appear in the formula C;
• any internal vertex has two children and computes the ∧ or ∨ of its two children; and the internal vertex is labelled by the resulting formula;
• the root of the tree is labelled by C.
Then the formula C can be described by the labelled binary tree in FIGURE 1 ,
defines a function from I = [d 1 ] × · · · × [d r ] to {0, 1} and thus a set
For every j ∈ [r] and x ∈ {0, 1}, let
Then it is easy to see that
Example 2:
, 0110, 0111, 1001, 1010, 1011, 1101, 1110, 1111}. Therefore, S is the union of the sets
In this paper, we shall construct VSOD schemes to compute i∈S m i , where S ⊆ I can be defined by a read-once formula C(x 1 , . . . , x r ) and r indicators functions {X j } r j=1 .
D. ALGEBRAIC PRF
In this section, we recall the notion of algebraic PRFs [3] and show two constructions of algebraic PRFs based on the techniques of [19] , [20] .
1) PSEUDORANDOM FUNCTIONS (PRFs)
Let (KeyGen, F) be a pair of polynomial-time algorithms, where KeyGen(λ, prms) takes a security parameter λ and a set prms of parameters as input and outputs both a secret key k and a public parameter pp; and F takes k and any i ∈ I as input and outputs F k (i) ∈ G (both I and G are determined by pp). We say that (KeyGen, F) is a PRF if for any PPT algorithm A, there is a negligible function negl(λ) such that
where the probabilities are taken over the choices of (pp, k) ← KeyGen(λ, prms), the choice of a truly random function R : I → G and the random coins of A. For every i = (i 1 , . . . , i r ) ∈ I , the function value F k (i) is computed as
As an instantiation of [20] , PRF 1 is secure under the DDH assumption.
Following the vein of [3] , PRF 1 has closed-form efficiency with respect to a computation ({F k (i)} i∈S ) over the pseudorandom values {F k (i)} i∈S , if there is an algorithm CFEval(·, ·) such that
and the running time of CFEval(k, S) is sublinear in |S|, the cardinality of S. For any S ⊆ I , let ({F k (i)} i∈S ) be a computation defined by
Below we shall show that PRF 1 has closed-form efficiency with respect to the computation of (10), as long as the set S is defined by a read-once formula C(x 1 , . . . , x r ) and r indicator functions X 1 , . . . , X r . We will give an example and then show the algorithm CFEval in general. , v ∈ [5]}) be the secret key of PRF 1 . We show that PRF 1 has closed-form efficiency with respect to (10) , with an algorithm CFEval that will be detailed as below. First of all, let φ 00 (i 1 ) = X 1 (i 1 ); φ 01 (i 2 ) = X 2 (i 2 ); φ 0 (i 1 , i 2 ) = φ 00 (i 1 ) ∨ φ 01 (i 2 ); φ 10 (i 3 ) = X 3 (i 3 ); φ 11 (i 4 ) = X 4 (i 4 );
Then it is easy to see that 1) .
Based on the above equation, CFEval(k, S) will reduce the computation of ({F k (i)} i∈S ) to that of
. It's easy to see that φ 0 (i 1 , i 2 ) = 1 if and only if (φ 00 (i 1 ), φ 01 (i 2 )) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. Therefore,
. Similarly, φ 1 (i 3 , i 4 ) = 1 if and only if (φ 10 (i 3 ), φ 11 (i 4 )) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. We have that 1) . Based on the above equations, CFEval(k, S) will compute A(φ, 1) with the following reductions: 
• reducing the computations in (11) to those of
Note that the computations in both (11) and (12) can be done in parallel. Therefore, the time required by CFEval(k, S) will not exceed the time required by • max{d 1 , . . . , d r } = 5 additions modulo p for computing (12) in parallel;
• r = 4 multiplications modulo p and r − 1 = 3 additions modulo p for computing (11) in parallel;
• 2 multiplications modulo p for computing k 0 A(φ, 1); 1) in the cyclic group G. It follows that CFEval(k, S) requires at most 8 additions modulo p, 6 multiplications modulo p and 1 exponentiation in the cyclic group G.
On the other hand, in a plain method without using CFEval(k, S), the client has to compute F k (i) for every i ∈ S and then multiply all these pseudorandom values. The entire process would require as many as 4|S| = 1024 multiplications modulo p, |S| = 256 exponentiations in the cyclic group G and |S| − 1 = 255 multiplications in the cyclic group G. TABLE 2 shows the comparisons between two different ways of computing ({F k (i)} i∈S ): CFEval(k, S) and the plain method. It is clear that CFEval(k, S) will be substantially faster.
Closed-Form Efficiency: Example 1 can be extended to a generic algorithm CFEval of computing A(φ, 1) recursively. In particular, we can construct a binary tree that takes the φ in (4) as root. Let C 0 and C 1 be the left and right child of C in its labelled binary tree representation. Then C = C 0 ∧ C 1 or C = C 0 ∨ C 1 . Moreover, C 0 and C 1 depend on completely independent literals. Let's define
Then we would have that
In our construction, the left and right child of φ will be φ 0 and φ 1 , respectively.
If we take the current leaf nodes as roots and construct their children in the same way, then finally we will get a tree whose root is φ and all leaf nodes belong to {X 1 (i 1 ), . . . , X r (i r ),X 1 (i 1 ), . . . ,X r (i r )} such that X j (i j ) (resp. X j (i j )) is a leaf if and only if x j (resp.x j ) appears in C.
Let D be the depth of the tree representation of C. Given this tree representation, for every s ∈ ∪ D d=1 {0, 1} d , every formula C s in this tree will depend on a set of literals
for v ∈ {0, 1}. Then CFEval(k, S) will compute A(φ, 1) recursively as follows: 1 for two formulas C s 0 and C s 1 , then compute
The running time of CFEval(k, S) will vary over different read-once formulas. In an extreme case, the formula C can be described by a complete binary tree of depth D = log 2 r. Let a d and b d be the number of multiplications and additions modulo p required by the computation in depth d. Based on (16) and (17), we have that
for every d ∈ {0, 1, . . . , D − 1}, a D = 0 and b D ≤ 2 · max{d 1 , . . . , d r }. So CFEval(k, S) requires ≤ a 0 + · · · + a D−1 + a D ≤ 3(r − 1) multiplications modulo p. In summary, CFEval(k, S) requires ≤ 2(r − 1) + 2 · max{d 1 , . . . , d r } = O(r + |S| 1/r ) additions modulo p (in most interesting cases, we have d i = O(d j ) for all i = j), ≤ 3(r − 1) + 1 = O(r) multiplications modulo p, and 1 exponentiation in G (see TABLE 3 ).
On the other hand, the plain method requires |S|r multiplications modulo p, |S| exponentiations in the cyclic group G, and |S| − 1 multiplications in the cyclic group G. 
3) AN ALGEBRAIC PRF BASED ON DLIN
Lewko and Waters [19] proposed a family of PRFs based on the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption. Below is an instantiation PRF 2 = (KeyGen, F) of their construction:
• KeyGen(λ, r): This algorithm takes a security parameter λ and an integer r as input. It chooses a λ-bit prime p and a bilinear group instance (p, G, G T , e, g), where g is a generator of the order p cyclic group G and e : G × G → G T is a bilinear map; it chooses (α, γ ) = (α 0 , β 0 ) · α 1,i 1 γ 1,i 1 β 1,i 1 δ 1,i 1 · · · α r,i r γ r,i r β r,i r δ r,i r and then outputs the function value as
As an instantiation of [19] , PRF 2 is secure under the DLIN assumption.
Similarly, we can show that PRF 2 has closed-form efficiency for the computation of (10), as long as S is defined by a read-once formula C(x 1 , . . . , x r ) and r indicator functions X 1 , . . . , X r . In particular, CFEval(k, S) requires O(r) matrix multiplications modulo p, O(r + |S| 1/r ) matrix additions modulo p, and 1 exponentiation in the cyclic group G (see TABLE 4 ). On the other hand, the plain method requires |S|r multiplications modulo p, |S| exponentiations in the cyclic group G, and |S| − 1 multiplications in the cyclic group G.
III. OUR SCHEMES
In this section we propose two VSOD schemes where the interesting subsets S are defined by read-once formulas. The first one of these schemes will be privately verifiable and the second one will be publicly verifiable. = (p, G, g, d 1 , . . . , d r ) . It chooses a ← Z p uniformly at random and computes
for every i ∈ I . Finally, this algorithm outputs t = {t i } i∈I , sk = (k, a).
• vk ← Vgen(sk, S): Suppose that the index set S is defined by (7) If the equality holds, it outputs 1; otherwise, this algorithm outputs 0. It is trivial to see that 1 is correct. The private verifiability of 1 requires that no PPT adversary is able to win in the standard security experiment of Definition 3 except with a negligible probability. 
be the probability that A wins in E i . It's easy to see that 0 = Pr[EXP PriVer 1 ,A (λ, m) = 1]. We need to show that 0 ≤ negl(λ). First of all, we must have that
Otherwise, we would be able to use A to break the security of PRF 1 , which however is secure under the DDH assumption and so results in a contradiction. Based on (21) , it suffices to show 1 ≤ negl(λ).
Below we shall show that 1 ≤ negl(λ) even if A is computationally unbounded. In the experiment E 1 , let t = {t i } i∈I and sk = (k, a) be generated by the challenger running the algorithm Stor(1 λ , m) 
, a ← Z p and t i = (i) for every i ∈ I . Given (m, t), the adversary A will issue a polynomial number of queries to the challenger and the challenger will response as follows:
-Based on its current view, A chooses an index set S ⊆ [n] and a pair (ρ ,π ) to the challenger, where S is defined by (7) with a read-once formula C :
{0, 1} r → {0, 1} and r indicator functions {X j } r j=1 ; -Given (S ,ρ ,π ), the challenger computes vk = i∈S (i). Ifπ = vk · g aρ , it defines b = 1; otherwise, it defines b = 0. The challenger also gives b to A. The adversary wins in E 1 if and only if there is an ∈ [q] such that b = 1 butρ = ρ i∈S m i . Therefore, A wins in E 1 only if it is able to find a valueρ = ρ and a valueπ such thatπ
Let α ,ᾱ ∈ Z p be the discrete logarithms of π andπ with respect to g, respectively, i.e., g α = π and gᾱ =π . By (22) , A wins in E 1 if and only if it is able to find a valuē ρ = ρ and a valueᾱ such that
Note that a is a secret key of the VSOD scheme, randomly chosen from the set Z p , and completely hidden from A when = 1. When A tries to satisfy (23) with (ρ 1 ,ᾱ 1 ), it will succeed with probability 1/p. If the trial fails, A will be able to rule out a possibility of a, i.e., (ᾱ 1 − α 1 )/(ρ 1 − ρ 1 ). As a result, in the second trial, A will succeed with probability ≤ 1/(p−1), as conditioned on the first trial a is still uniformly distributed over the p−1 values Z p \{(ᾱ 1 −α 1 )/(ρ 1 −ρ 1 )}. In general, if A has failed in the first − 1 trials, then a will be still uniformly distributed over the set
As a result, in the th trial, it will succeed with probability ≤ 1/(p − + 1). Let L ∈ [q] be the smallest integer such that A succeeds in the Lth trial. Then
which will be negligible in λ as long as p ≈ 2 λ is a λ-bit prime and q = poly(λ) is polynomial in λ. 
• vk ← Vgen(sk, S): Suppose that the index set S is defined by (7) with a read-once formula C(x 1 , . . . , x r ) and r indicator functions {X j } r j=1 . This algorithm computes and outputs vk = (vk 1 , vk 2 ) = g a , e i∈S F k (i), g a using PRF 2 .CFEval(k, S). If the equality holds, it outputs 1; otherwise, this algorithm outputs 0. It is trivial to see that 2 is correct. The public verifiability of 2 requires that no PPT adversary is able to win in the standard security experiment except with a negligible probability. 
be the probability that A wins in E i . It's easy to see that 0 = Pr[EXP PubVer 2 ,A (λ, m) = 1]. We need to show that 0 ≤ negl(λ). First of all, we must have that
Otherwise, we would be able to use A to break the security of PRF 1 , which however is secure under the DLIN assumption and so results in a contradiction. Based on (25), it suffices to show 1 ≤ negl(λ). Assume for contradiction that 1 is non-negligible. We shall construct a simulator B (plays the role of challenger in E 1 ) that uses A to solve the CDH problem in the cyclic group G = g . The simulator is given a pair (g a , h). It is required to output h a .
In the experiment E 1 , instead of executing the algorithm Stor(1 λ , m) , the simulator will choose t i ← G for every i ∈ I . It then gives m and t = {t i } i∈I to A. Note that the distribution of (m, t) perfectly simulates that in E 1 . Given (m, t), A will issue a polynomial number of queries to B and B will response as below: for = 1 to q (q = poly(λ) is a polynomial in λ)
• Based on its current view, A chooses an index set S ⊆ [n] to the challenger, where S is defined by (7) with a read-once formula C : {0, 1} r → {0, 1} and r indicator functions {X j } r j=1 ; • Given S , the simulator needs to produce a public verification key vk = (vk ,1 , vk ,2 ) which is identically distributed to those in the experiment E 1 . This will be done by setting
It is trivial to verify the vk computed in this way is identically distributed to the vk generated by Vgen. After making those queries, A will produce a tuple (S,ρ,π ) and sends it to B. Then A wins in the simulation if and only if ρ = ρ and e(π , g) = e(vk 1 , hρ) · vk 2 ,
where vk 1 = g a and vk 2 = i∈S e(g, t i )/e(g a , h) m i . On the other hand, let ρ = i∈S m i and π = i∈S t i be the faithfully computed result and proof. The correctness of 2 implies that e(π, g) = e(vk 1 , h ρ ) · vk 2 .
Based on (26) and (27), the adversary A wins in the simulation only if it is able to find a valueρ = ρ and a valueπ such that e(π/π , g) = e(vk 1 , h ρ−ρ ) = e(g a , h ρ−ρ) , which implies that h a = (π/π ) 1 ρ−ρ .
By computing h a with (28), the simulator B will successfully solves the CDH problem as long as A wins in the experiment E 1 , which occurs with probability 1 . Under the CDH assumption, this will result in a contradiction because 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We implemented our VSOD schemes and evaluated their performances. For each scheme, we do comparisons between our client-side computation cost and the native computation cost. We use the GMP (GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic) and the PBC (Pairing-Based Cryptography) libraries, both written in C language, to implement all schemes. We execute the programs on a virtual machine that runs on an Ubuntu Desktop (Version 16.04.1) operating system, with 8GB RAM and the Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 5218 CPU processor of 2.30GHz. All experiments were run as the only user initiated process on the CPU. We chose the protocol parameters for 128-bit security and used elliptic curve subgroups of prime order p ≈ 2 256 for the cyclic groups. TABLE 5 contains the running time of the algorithms in our VSOD schemes and the native computation's running time for different input size |S|. We also describe the last two columns of TABLE 5 in FIGURE 2. FIGURE 2 shows that the running time of Vgen and Vrfy are quite steady in both schemes. On the other hand, the running time of the native computation keeps increasing as |S| is increasing. When |S| ≥ 2 × 10 5 , the total running time of Vgen and Vrfy in our VSOD schemes, i.e., T Vgen + T Vrfy , is less than the native computation's running time T S . Therefore, we can easily conclude that both of our schemes are outsourceable.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new VSOD model for securely outsourcing the summation of outsourced data items, where the summation is taken over a read-once formula defined subset of the entire dataset. We constructed two VSOD schemes in this model. One of them is privately verifiable and the other is publicly verifiable. The verifiability of our schemes guarantees that no malicious server would be able to persuade the client to accept a wrong value. Our schemes are outsourceable as the client-side computation is substantially faster than the native computation of the summation. The outsourceability of our schemes is based on algebraic PRFs with closed-form efficiency and do not require multiple datasets. An additional security problem in the filed of outsourcing computation is how to keep the client's data (such as the m, S and ρ in our model) secret from the untrusted cloud server. In this paper, we are not trying to address this kind of security problem, which could be an interesting direction for future work.
